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In recent years, risk analysis techniques have proved to be a useful tool to inform dam safety manage-
ment. This paper summarizes the outcomes of three themes related to dam risk analysis discussed in 
the Benchmark Workshops organized by the International Commission on Large Dams Technical Com-
mittee on “Computational Aspects of Analysis and Design of Dams.” In the 2011 Benchmark Workshop, 
estimation of the probability of failure of a gravity dam for the sliding failure mode was discussed. Next, 
in 2013, the discussion focused on the computational challenges of the estimation of consequences in 
dam risk analysis. Finally, in 2015, the probability of sliding and overtopping in an embankment was an-
alyzed. These Benchmark Workshops have allowed a complete review of numerical aspects for dam risk 
analysis, showing that risk analysis methods are a very useful tool to analyze the risk of dam systems, 
including downstream consequence assessments and the uncertainty of structural models. 
© 2016 THE AUTHORS. Published by Elsevier LTD on behalf of Chinese Academy of Engineering and 
Higher Education Press Limited Company. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND 
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
A reliable evaluation of safety levels for structures such as 
dams—which have a very strong socioeconomic impact on local 
areas, and which can represent a potential hazard for the people 
and environment that may be affected by their presence—is of 
the utmost importance for the different stakeholders involved.
The capability of numerical models to contribute in engi-
neering practice to the quantitative evaluation of the safety 
margins of structures is nowadays taken for granted in the dam 
engineering domain, thanks in part to the great amount of work 
done by the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) 
Technical Committee on “Computational Aspects of Analysis and 
Design of Dams.” However, the application of numerical models 
to real-world problems has suffered for some time from the gap 
between mathematical modeling specialists and dam engineers 
and managers. The first group includes information system spe-
cialists who are able to develop computer models to their full 
potential, while the second group often comprises professionals 
who prefer to revert to traditional methods of calculation and 
empirical methods based on their proven experience. The main 
aim of the Committee was to contribute to the filling of this gap 
and to promote the diffusion of computer software in the field of 
dam engineering. The Committee was appointed by ICOLD as an 
ad hoc committee in 1988; finally, during the 2005 ICOLD Annual 
Meeting, the Committee was appointed as a permanent Technical 
Committee. 
In its intent to guide and help dam engineers wishing to make 
correct use of computer programs and numerical models, the 
Committee has promoted a wide-ranging benchmarking pro-
gram. So far, 13 Benchmark Workshops have been organized; the 
first occurred in 1991 (in Bergamo, Italy), and the most recent one 
took place in 2015 (in Lausanne, Switzerland). Among the differ-
ent technical aims of the Committee activities, the following aims 
are worth mentioning: the creation of a stronger link between 
observed dam behavior and the modeling process; the issuing of 
guidelines to be used for educational purposes in current prac-
tice; the promotion of mathematical modeling improvements 
to approach safety-related problems; and the assessment of the 
potentialities of computer codes in order to optimize design, 
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instrumentation, surveillance, and safety/risk evaluation proce-
dures. Regarding the last topic, three themes tightly connected to 
risk assessment have been proposed from 2011 to 2015 (Fig. 1), 
for which the main different phases of the process have been ex-
tensively investigated. The present paper describes in detail those 
themes proposed in the Benchmark Workshops in 2011, 2013, and 
2015 related to dam risk assessment and the main results obtained.
2. Valencia 2011: Estimation of the probability of failure of a 
gravity dam for the sliding failure mode
The 11th ICOLD Benchmark Workshop on Numerical Analy-
sis of Dams took place in Valencia from October 20 to 21, 2011. 
The objective of Theme C of the 2011 edition was to obtain 
relationships between water pool levels, factors of safety, and 
probabilities of failure for an 80 m high gravity dam considering 
the sliding failure mode (foundation contact). Different models 
were used for the analysis of the dam and its foundation, along 
with reliability techniques. Contributions from eight teams were 
reported; these can be found in Ref. [1]. The 8 participant teams 
were from Ricerca Sistema Energetico (RSE), Technical University 
of Bucharest (UTBC), Sogreah Consultants (SC-AG), JSC “Vedeneev 
Vniig” (VNIIG), Polytechnic University of Valencia (UPV), Royal 
Institute of Technology of Sweden (RIT), Polytechnic University of 
Madrid (UPM), and Ingeniería de Presas (iPresas). The following 
process was followed to solve the formulated problem.
2.1. Factor of safety
First, each group of participants chose a 2D model to compute 
the factor of safety (sliding failure mode) for different water pool 
levels. All contributors considered at least a 2D rigid-body limit 
equilibrium model (LEM). Despite the strong evolutions devel-
oped in more sophisticated, finite element-based models, LEM is 
still recognized by contributors as the most popular and accepted 
method to evaluate dam safety for this failure mode [2]. In LEMs, 
the evolution of the horizontal crack was simulated as reducing 
the effective area at the contact interface between the dam and 
its foundation that provides resistance to the overturning mo-
ment. Two teams also considered deformable-body models to 
evaluate the crack length, implemented in finite element model 
(FEM) codes. In these models, different approaches were used to 
simulate the horizontal crack. Factor of safety was computed for 
two cases: effective and ineffective drains. Fig. 2 shows differenc-
es among team results for the first case. 
As can be observed in Fig. 2, there are significant differences 
among the results prior to the application of reliability tech-
niques. These differences are mainly due to the selected hypothe-
sis and setup. Another important aspect is how the factor of safe-
ty was defined. As shown in Fig. 2, using the same LEM of analysis 
and data set of strength parameters does not necessarily result in 
the same outcomes. 
2.2. Friction angle and cohesion
Next, each group defined the distribution of selected random 
variables: friction angle (ϕ) and cohesion (c). The decision regard-
ing how friction was considered (i.e., whether the random vari-
able is the friction angle, ϕ, or the friction coefficient, tanϕ) had 
some impact on the results obtained. Based on results, it seems 
that when tanϕ is selected and a normal probability density 
function (PDF) is assumed, probabilities are higher than when an 
analysis uses ϕ as the selected parameter and considers it to be 
normally distributed. 
Another decision is what PDF may be reasonable to use. In this 
case, an unusually high number of data were provided to make 
the process easier; however, this is not always the case in real- 
world problems, where few data are available (if any). Despite the 
data provided, several distributions were suggested or considered 
by contributors (normal, log-normal, Rayleigh, and beta distribu-
tions).
Decisions related to PDFs are not only linked to the selected 
distributions but also to the physical meaning of the given adap-
tation. When an unbounded PDF is used as the normal distribu-
tion, the required decision on its truncation becomes a key point 
of the analysis process, as shown in the results. Again, engineer-
ing judgement comes into play when assessing the minimum 
values to be adopted for the truncation of a PDF.
2.3. Failure probability
Next, participants estimated the probability of failure for the 
sliding failure mode using at least a Level 2 reliability method 
and a Level 3 Monte Carlo simulation method. These reliability 
methods are described in detail in Ref. [3]. The type of reliability 
method used also had a significant impact on results. Analysis 
with Level 2 methods is relatively easy to perform and, as long 
as the number of variables is low, is not time-consuming. Level 
3 Monte Carlo simulation methods provide more precise results, 
but the computing effort may be much higher. Level 2 and Level 
3 methods were used in combination with the LEM of analysis. In 
general, Level 3 reliability methods provided lower failure proba-
bilities than Level 2 methods. 
2.4. Event tree modelling
Finally, many teams combined the results of the two proposed 
drainage system conditions, and the total failure probability was 
obtained by combining individual probabilities in an event tree. 
Results for Level 3 methods are shown in Fig. 3, including analy-
ses made by teams from RSE, RIT, VNIIG, UPV, UPM, and iPresas.
Fig. 3 shows significant differences in the results that were 
obtained by the participants. Most of these differences are due 
Fig. 1. Connection among themes and risk components of Benchmark Workshops.
Fig. 2. Relation between factor of safety and water pool level obtained by partici-
pants for the “drains effective” case.
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models.
In addition, a wide variety of techniques were used by the 
participant teams to produce the necessary flood output data 
for consequence analyses. Dam failure hydrodynamic simulation 
results depend on input datasets (e.g., breach discharge, topogra-
phy, roughness) and method approach. Participants used different 
approaches to estimate roughness coefficients, thus providing 
consequence outcomes with significant differences.
The maximum flooded area for each solution was in the range 
of 30 km² to 47 km². However, the majority of solutions show 
substantial similarity when results are compared among partici-
pants (by pairs). Despite the observed similarity in the extent of 
the flooding area, the results for flood-wave arrival time differ 
among solutions, depending on the considered threshold to de-
fine the arrival time (i.e., the time at which the flood depth reach-
es a given value).
3.2. Population at risk (PAR)
Census and land-use data was provided by the formulators. 
The spatial distribution of the population within the flooded 
area varied among the participants. Three participants uniformly 
distributed the population available in the census blocks to prop-
erly sum the affected population within partially flooded census 
blocks. Another three participants redistributed the population to 
the parcel data provided. One of the contributors accounted for 
residential population and workforce population within the par-
cels. Finally, another participant used imperviousness defined by 
developed areas to distribute population. 
These differences in population distribution resulted in a range 
of PAR from 15 000 to 30 000 inhabitants (approx.), although the 
solutions presented consistent results in terms of PAR in flood 
depths below 2 m. However, significant differences were found in 
how participants defined flood severity (e.g., flood severity based 
on exposed population or impact on buildings).
3.3. Loss of life (LOL)
The majority of solutions provided similar results for LOL, 
with estimates around 2000 potential fatalities. The identified 
disagreement in one of the provided solutions was due to the 
definition of flood severity values, which resulted in nearly 4000 
fatalities.
3.4. Direct economic damage
Because of the difference in methods used for economic con-
sequence estimation (e.g., gross domestic product (GDP) vs. insur-
able losses), and the assumption regarding asset value, the results 
provided ranged from $0.4 billion to $2.6 billion USD.
Results from this Benchmark Workshop showed that, in gen-
eral, outcomes were similar in terms of hydrodynamics. However, 
flood-wave arrival times differed between teams. As stated by the 
formulators, this is attributable to differences in the calculation 
of the breach hydrograph and in regression and physics-based 
formulations. The largest differences in peak flood depths were 
likely due to the requirement for teams using irregular meshes to 
report output in a structured grid format.
Although PAR estimates were also similar across teams, differ-
ences in flood-wave arrival times and flood severity were found. 
Finally, some significant differences in the economic consequence 
analyses were found, mainly due to the interpretation of direct 
impact and the estimation of asset values.
In conclusion, despite the existence in the literature of guide-
lines and references for LOL and economic consequence estima-
to the way in which the 2D model was set up and how random 
variables were defined. When comparing the results obtained 
with LEM and FEM using the Level 3 Monte Carlo method, it is 
observed that when drains are effective, both models give similar 
values for water pool levels below the dam crest level. For water 
levels above the dam crest, the probability of failure estimated 
with the FEM approaches a value of 1, while the LEM predicts 
values below 10–2, since the linear stress distribution assumption 
embedded in the LEM seems to be on the “unsafe” side. 
In conclusion, the results presented by contributors opened 
a field of discussion on the main sources of uncertainty, which 
include type of model, factor of safety definition, and statistical 
analysis of random variables. In general, more research is needed 
to handle uncertainties, as parameter uncertainty is only part of 
the problem; other sources of uncertainty became explicitly pres-
ent throughout the process.
3. Graz 2013: Computational challenges in consequence 
estimation for risk assessment
The 12th Benchmark Workshop on Numerical Analysis of 
Dams took place in Graz from October 2 to 4, 2013. The objective 
of Theme C, titled “Computational Challenges in Consequence 
Estimation for Risk Assessment” (formulated by Yazmin Seda- 
Sanabria, Enrique E. Matheu, and Timothy N. McPherson [4]), was 
to obtain the potential consequences in the case of failure for an 
embankment dam that is 3.5 km upstream from an urban area. 
Participants were asked to select the type and sophistication 
of the simulation engines used to solve the problem, including 
1D, 2D, and 3D flood simulation tools, population at risk (PAR) 
and loss of life (LOL) estimation techniques, and asset and conse-
quence assessment models. Within Theme C, addressing human 
consequences (e.g., PAR and LOL) and direct economic impact was 
required.
Contributions from eight participants were presented, and a 
full description can be found in Ref. [4]. The comparison of results 
was based on the following categories.
3.1. Flood characteristics
Participants used a range of models, including physics-based 
breach models using dam material information and regression 
equations based on previous dam failures. The choice of model, 
method, and parameters can significantly affect the time and 
magnitude of the peak discharge. Results show that models using 
regression equations had a much earlier peak than physics-based 
Fig. 3. Relation between probability of failure and water pool level obtained by 
participants using Level 3 reliability methods.
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tion (e.g., Refs. [5–7]), due to the wide range of potential methods 
and definitions, the assumptions made by participants resulted 
in some significant differences in consequence results. However, 
despite those differences, it is noted that, in general, outcomes for 
LOL and economic damages were in the same order of magnitude.
4. Lausanne 2015: Probability of failure of an embankment 
dam due to slope instability and overtopping 
The failure of an embankment dam was discussed in Theme C 
during the 13th Benchmark Workshop, which took place in Lau-
sanne from September 9 to 11, 2015. In this problem, which was 
inspired by a real case of a dam (located in Spain), although with 
non-real resistance and hydrological data, the main focus consist-
ed of calculating fragility curves for slope instability and overtop-
ping failure modes and using them to calculate annualized failure 
probability, accounting for both natural and epistemic uncertain-
ty, as described in Ref. [8]. Three different solutions were present-
ed by Benchmark Workshop participants; these are provided in 
Refs. [9–11]. In this section, these solutions are compared with 
the reference solution presented by the problem formulators. 
The embankment analyzed is a homogeneous 16 m high 
earth-fill dam. In recent years, this embankment had small in-
stability problems in the downstream slope, so a quantitative 
risk analysis was proposed to estimate annual failure probability. 
Two failure modes were analyzed: overtopping and dam insta-
bility. In both failure modes, water pool level was supposed to 
be the driving force of failure. The problem was divided into five 
different phases.
4.1. Analysis of information for the instability failure mode
The first step involved the elaboration of a slope instability 
limit model for the downstream slope of the embankment, and 
the definition of the main random variables in this model. In this 
step, very different instability approaches were considered by 
participants, from simple LEMs to complete FEMs. In addition, 
two different assumptions were compared for hydraulic condi-
tions: steady-state and transient.   
In these models, two random variables were recommended fol-
lowing a Mohr-Coulomb type of failure criteria: friction angle and 
cohesion. The main statistical parameters of these variables were 
provided to the participants for natural and epistemic uncertainty.    
4.2. Calculation of reference fragility curves
The reference fragility curve (relation between water pool level 
and failure probability) for the slope instability was computed us-
ing the natural uncertainty distributions of the random variables 
defined in the previous step. When the fragility curves obtained 
with these models are compared (Fig. 4), it can be observed that 
the participants obtained very different results, although all of 
them used the same random variables with the same distribu-
tions and the same geometry. These results show the high influ-
ence of the hypothesis made and the model considered in the 
instability results. The results also show a significant influence of 
the number of Monte Carlo simulations made. 
During the Benchmark Workshop discussion, it was highlight-
ed that the hydraulic hypotheses are especially significant. In this 
case, considering a steady state could lead to underestimating 
the slope resistance capacity. In any case, it should be remarked 
that when numerical models are set up, many small hypotheses 
are made that can influence the results. For example, two partic-
ipants with the same software tool, the same geometry, and the 
same random variables obtained very different fragility curves. 
The reference fragility curve for the overtopping failure mode 
was directly defined with a log-normal distribution. This fragility 
curve is a relation between overtopping height and failure proba-
bility. All participants concluded that the slope instability failure 
mode was clearly more significant than overtopping, according to 
the results. 
The reference fragility curves of both failure modes should be 
combined in order to compute a single reference fragility curve 
that represents the structural behavior of this embankment for 
different pool levels. 
Common cause adjustment techniques [12] were used to com-
bine both failure modes in all solutions. Using the upper or lower 
limit for this combination did not have a strong influence, since 
the slope instability failure mode is clearly predominant and 
overtopping is only activated for water pool levels with very low 
probability. 
4.3. Computation of water pool level probabilities
The objective of this phase was to obtain a relation between 
water pool levels and annual exceedance probability (AEP). This 
curve was estimated by evaluating flood routing in the reservoir 
for different flood events and bottom outlet availability situations, 
based on the data provided regarding floods and the reservoir. All 
participants obtained similar exceedance probability curves for 
water pool levels. All of them used the same floods and reservoir 
data, and flood routing rules were very simple, so flood routing 
results are very similar in the four solutions. 
4.4. Computing failure probability and sensitivity analysis
The curve computed in the previous phase, combined with the 
reference fragility curve, was used to calculate the reference fail-
ure probability. The comparison of results obtained for the annual 
failure probability show high differences, with values ranging 
from 1.8 × 10–1 to 4.1 × 10–3. These differences are mainly due to 
the different fragility curves used, showing that the hypotheses 
made to analyze this failure mode are clearly conditioning the 
results. High values were obtained for annual dam failure prob-
ability, mainly due to the modification of dam resistance and 
hydrological data made by the formulators in order to increment 
conditional failure probabilities, reducing the number of samples 
and computations needed to characterize them.
4.5. Assessing epistemic uncertainty
In this phase, epistemic uncertainty was defined with a prob-
 Fig. 4. Comparison of sliding fragility curves computed by participants.
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ability distribution for the mean of each random variable. These 
distributions were used to obtain a family of fragility curves for 
the instability failure mode. The family of fragility curves for the 
overtopping failure mode was directly defined in the formulation. 
Finally, the two families of fragility curves were combined to 
obtain a profile of failure probability. Only two participants con-
ducted this phase, as shown in Fig. 5. There are large differences 
in these two profiles, in line with the differences in the fragility 
curves obtained with the instability models. In both solutions, 
failure probability profiles showed that small variations in the 
resistance parameter distributions produce important variations 
in the obtained fragility curves. This result highlights the impor-
tance of assessing epistemic uncertainty separately. 
The main differences among the contributions are due to dif-
ferences in the fragility curves introduced in the instability failure 
mode. The comparison showed that very different results can 
be obtained depending on the hypotheses made, even using the 
same geometry and resistance parameters. The hydraulic con-
ditions hypothesis had an especially high influence. Therefore, 
uncertainty is not only derived from the resistance parameters; 
other uncertainty sources are the selected slope instability model 
and the hydraulic behavior of the embankment. 
Risk analysis has been demonstrated to be a useful tool to ana-
lyze the impact of the hypotheses made. In addition, the obtained 
results may indicate where uncertainty reduction efforts should 
be allocated. Therefore, distinction between natural and epistem-
ic uncertainties is fundamental in geotechnical analyses for dam 
safety management.
5. Conclusions
New techniques for performing risk assessments are now 
available and provide information to support decisions for dam 
maintenance or rehabilitation. Since 2011, ICOLD Committee is 
addressing this issue from a computational perspective, and is 
also providing context for researchers and dam managers to un-
derstand and pay attention to decisions that are typically made 
in both risk analyses and in standard design techniques (i.e., fre-
quency of events, factors of safety, breaching parameters, etc.).
Incorporating risk analysis in the last three Benchmark Work-
shops organized by this Committee has allowed a wide approach 
to these techniques, covering the three risk components: loads, 
system response, and consequences. The high participation in all 
Benchmark Workshops and the number of solutions presented 
show the interest of the dam community in reliability methods 
and the application of risk analysis to dam safety. In this sense, 
Benchmark Workshops have promoted knowledge exchange and 
discussions. 
Recent advances in computational methods have allowed a 
higher development of risk analysis techniques, evolving from 
simple structural models to complex numerical procedures and 
methods. However, there is still room for improvement—for ex-
ample, in properly addressing epistemic uncertainty when data 
are collected and risk calculations are made. 
Benchmark Workshops have shown that when an engineer-
ing problem (even a relatively simple, straightforward, and well-
known one) is combined with risk analysis techniques, results 
should be analyzed in the light of sound engineering judgement 
in order to obtain meaningful and useful information to inform 
dam safety management.
Benchmark Workshop outcomes show that when numerical 
models are applied to a dam safety analysis, hypotheses may 
modify the results significantly. Therefore, hypotheses should be 
clearly reported and explained when results are presented. In this 
Fig. 5. Comparison of failure probability profiles computed by participants.
sense, risk analysis has been demonstrated to be a useful tool to 
analyze the impact of the hypotheses that engineers assume in 
normal design practice, and which are often overlooked.
Suggestions for further research include:
(1) Analyzing the impact of epistemic uncertainty. To better 
understand the impact on risk outcomes of epistemic uncertainty 
on load and resistance parameters.
(2) Analyzing risk from a multi-hazard approach. To estimate 
risk through a comprehensive approach, including all potential 
hazards (e.g., floods, earthquakes) and existing correlations.
(3) Analyzing correlations among different failure modes. To 
incorporate existing correlations among failure mechanisms to 
better characterize risk, and to analyze the impact of different 
assumptions (e.g., hypothesis used for common cause adjust-
ment).
(4) Including evacuation and human behavior on consequence 
estimation. To better characterize potential consequences in case 
of dam failure and flooding due to uncontrolled releases, includ-
ing uncertainty on warning and evacuation effectiveness.
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